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Abstract—Considerable concerns exist over privacy on social
networks, and huge debates persist about how to extend the
artifacts users need to effectively protect their rights to privacy.
While many interesting ideas have been proposed, no single
approach appears to be comprehensive enough to be the front
runner. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive and novel
reference conceptual model for privacy in constantly evolving
social networks and establish its novelty by briefly contrasting
it with contemporary research. We also present the contours
of a possible query language that we can develop with desirable
features in light of the reference model, and refer to a new query
language, PiQL, developed on the basis of this model that aims to
support user driven privacy policy authoring and enforcement.
The strength of our model is that such extensions are now possible
by developing appropriate linguistic constructs as part of query
languages such as SQL, as demonstrated in PiQL.
Keywords-privacy; social network, evolving networks; content
visibility; peer rules; exceptions; global accessibility;
I. INTRODUCTION
In its basic form, privacy means unwanted disclosure pre-
vention of information content of an individual or entity1. As
the number of individuals or the size of their information
holdings in an information system grow, the complexity of
privacy assurance also increases. This is mainly because the
rules for visibility and accessibility grow more complex, and
conflicts and exception become dominant making enforcement
more difficult. In the context of social networks, the sheer
number of users make it impossible for system administra-
tors to develop privacy rules based on roles or rights. The
responsibility is left to individuals or users to define their
own privacy rules. However, it becomes a daunting task
for users to individually define privacy rules for such an
overwhelming number of users most of whom they don’t
even know. To further complicate matters, social networks
are increasingly being exploited for commercial means which
necessitates grouping the user base around various business
objective functions that are often volatile, forcing frequent
restructuring of the relationship network among the users.
A comprehensive privacy model that accommodates all these
competing needs and captures all these complex characteristics
1One concomitant issue is security that deals with threats of intrusion that
breaks down the infrastructure put in place to protect the privacy in order to
gain access to protected information. This paper is primarily focused on the
privacy, and we take the view that security is an orthogonal issue that can be
dealt with separately, and hence, we will not be discussed any further.
is still outstanding. The overall goal of this paper is to propose
a reference conceptual model for privacy in evolving social
networks that we believe elucidates a set of characteristics a
good comprehensive privacy model should have, and discuss
how the current trends fare in light of this model.
Privacy in social networks such as FaceBook, LinkedIn,
Flickr, Twitter, Ning, and MySpace has been approached
from multiple viewpoints and interesting solutions have been
proposed. The solutions proposed thus far favor one or the
other groups of users and fail to address many critical needs.
Given the sheer size of the user base in these social networking
sites and the diversity of the growing digital communities, it
is safe to anticipate that the issue of privacy will remain active
for the foreseeable future. As we will discuss in this paper,
the issue of privacy permeates across many different aspects
of social network infrastructure and due considerations must
be given to each of them.
A. Related Research
Privacy on the internet, especially on social networks, has
different meanings for different interest groups. The basic
ingredients of a social network are a set of users, the “actors”,
a set of information contents owned by these actors, their
relationship with other users, and the behavior captured as
actions they perform. These actions may involve sharing their
information contents with other users they call friends, com-
municate with each other, express opinion, and so on. Such
actions can be anything that people usually do in their physical
world that can be transmitted electronically with some of these
actions kept private, just as they do in the real world. The
real value of these communities and the networks, however,
is actually in the behavior a user exhibits as a member of the
network they are part of, and not necessarily in the information
content they own.
There is less debate about what is private content that
each user owns [1], [2]. Generally, all content of a user is
considered private when it comes to other users, except the
system and the network administrator [3], [4], [5]. There is
some debate though about what privacy rights a user retains
on the information he chooses to share by making it visible
with a set of friends [6], [7], and whether he can revoke those
visibilities at will [8], [9]. Or, does sharing mean a user gains
the right to do “whatever” with the information content she
can access in the network [10]. The major debate, however,
is over the use of the behavioral information of users that
administrators can gather and use for their own purpose [11],
[12], [13], [14], [15], [16]. The issue in point is whether they
can do so without violating the basic privacy rights users
would like to enjoy [17], [18].
B. Our Contributions
As mentioned at the outset, our goal in this paper is to
propose a reference data model for social network to support
a user defined privacy articulation mechanism and query
language for fine-grain privacy policies. The proposed model
in section II is based on the results of a brief survey of con-
temporary research which is at the heart of this presentation.
Although there are many interesting dimensions that can be
used to compare existing models, in the interest of conciseness
and focus, we will evaluate our model on five different axes.
In section III, we discuss issues related to default privacy
rules. Privacy implications of dynamic networks is discussed in
section IV. User power to manage and control privacy rights
is discussed in section V. Finally, privacy models and their
representation issues are presented respectively in sections VI
and VII. We hope to highlight the simplicity and potentials of
the proposed reference model on intuitive grounds and discuss
research that address the issues we raise. We believe scattered
machineries are available to realize our model and develop a
query language using it. We discuss the outline of a possible
query language in section VIII that is capable of addressing the
issues raised in a comprehensive manner before we conclude
in section IX. As an aside, we note that to substantiate our
claim that development of a language to address these issues
is quite possible, we refer readers to a new query language,
called privacy query language or PiQL [19], that has been
proposed recently based on the reference model introduced in
this paper.
II. A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR PRIVACY
IN EVOLVING SOCIAL NETWORKS
We introduce our conceptual network privacy model using
the example shown in figure 1 on intuitive grounds. The
model includes four main objects – members, groups, contents
and associations. Figure 1 shows a small hypothetical social
network.
A. Members, Groups and Contents
In this figure, members are shown as labeled circles, and
groups are shown as labeled rectangles. Members are assigned
to groups based on some arbitrary principles such as shared
properties, membership of an institution, interests or location.
For example, Nina and Alex are in UMichStudents group
because they are UMich students. Members may belong to
multiple groups as needed. These groups are dynamic and may
be reorganized at any time without restrictions. Each member
may have contents they own such as personal information,
photos, documents, etc. that they introduce into the network
or remove from it from time to time. In this figure, NinaPhoto,
FamilyPhotos, and Blog are some of the contents Nina owns.
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Fig. 1. Nina’s content visibility on social net.
B. Associations
In this model associations are the vital tools that make
the network meaningful. There are three types of associations
– group and content hierarchies, and visibility assignments.
Groups are organized in a directed acyclic graph in which a
member in a group G is considered a member of another group
S as well if G is a subgroup of S. In this figure, PistonFans is
a subgroup of Michiganders, and hence JJ is also a member
of Michiganders. Since groups and members can belong
to multiple groups as members of subgroups, JJ is shown
to belong to two groups – UMichStudents and PistonFans.
Contents can be organized in a tree-like hierarchy2. In this
figure, Nina organized her contents under Everything as a
rooted tree.
1) Content Visibility: Content visibility assignments are
created by members and altered anytime without restriction.
In this paper, we consider only two modes of visibility or
access rights – visible and invisible3. Visibility of any node
in the members’ content hierarchy in one of the two modes is
assigned to any node in the social network. The logical impli-
cation of such an assignment follows the notions of inheritance
in object-oriented systems with overriding. Hence, a visibility
mode assigned to a network hierarchy node remains implicitly
in effect for the subgroups and members of the group until it
is overridden by another explicit visibility assignment. This
visibility of the content also applies to contents lower in the
content hierarchy as well. Intuitively, Nina makes NinaPhoto
visible to all, but makes it invisible for Michiganders. Hence,
Sue will see her photo, but nothing else. On the other hand,
Prema will see nothing although Michiganders is a subgroup
of all, and by default should inherit the visibility right of her
photo from all. This is because Nina made (essentially revoked
the visibility right) Everything invisible to Michiganders, and
NinaPhoto being a member of Everything, this invisibility
applies to this object as well.
2However, in this paper, we only consider the case where contents are
organized in like tree structures to align ourselves with the directory structures
of file systems. This design choice can be altered to a more general DAG like
organization with no disruption to the proposed model. But we do not foresee
any practical benefit to this alternative choice.
3We will discuss, in a later section, how this binary visibility model can
be extended to include a lattice like access right policy to include read, write,
update, and republish type of authorizations.
2) Implied Visibility: The implication of a set of explicit
visibility assignments in our model is intricate and yet far
more refined than any other known visibility models. Consider,
for example, Taylor. Nina allowed him access to her personal
information and hence, he will see everything under the
node PersonalInfo in her content hierarchy. In addition, he
will also see Nina’s Blog because she made it visible for
PistonFans, and Taylor is a member of this group. However,
Bob will only see Nina’s Blog and photo, and JJ will see
everything. Notice that the visibility assignment of Blog and
NinaPhoto for PistonFans overrides the visibility assignment
of Michiganders. An implication of this reassignment is that
the invisibility of all her personal information, except the
photo, remain in effect for all members of Michiganders,
except otherwise reassigned/overriden by her.
3) Visibility Protocol: Since we allow members to belong to
multiple groups and arbitrary group hierarchies, it is possible
that a member may inherit conflicting visibility rights via
alternate membership hierarchies. For example, JJ inherits
visibility right for Nina’s phone number by being a member
of UMichStudents group, but is prohibited from accessing it
by being a member of Michiganders. Perhaps Nina fears that
since she allowed PistonsFans to see her photo, it is not safe to
share her phone number with someone living near her home in
Michigan who is also a Piston fan, while she trusts all UMich
students. Now the question is should JJ be allowed access
to Nina’s phone number? The answer lies in the visibility
protocol adopted. We identify two protocols – optimistic and
pessimistic. JJ will see the phone number under the optimistic
protocol where we accept the most permissive access right,
and disallow it under a pessimistic protocol when conflicting
rights are assigned, implicitly or otherwise. So, even under the
optimistic protocol, Bob will only see her photo and Blog.
4) Membership Reassignment: Grouping of members in
a network is often accomplished by complex clustering al-
gorithms, and such clusters are often recomputed as the
population grows and their attributes change over time. Since
content visibility to such large groups of members is usually
assigned via group assignment rather than individual assign-
ments, member visibility rights may change if their group
assignment changes in a manner that affects their implied
visibility rights. For example, consider members Sue, Bob,
Taylor and Mike. Initially, there was no Yankees group, and Sue
was not a member of any group. At a later time, a new group
Yankees is created by the system administrator. Sue, as well
as Bob and Taylor’s membership has changed to this group
shown using dashed lines, and the dashed Yankees group.
A new member Mike is also added to this group. Now the
question is, what visibility rights do each one of them have
to Nina’s contents? In our model, Mike will inherit visibility
right to Nina’s photo via the group all, and Sue will retain
her right to Nina’s photo as well. However, Bob will lose his
right to Nina’s Blog and PistonPhotos because access to those
contents was through implicit rights via PistonFans, a group
to which he no longer belongs. On the other hand, Taylor will
continue to enjoy his access to Nina’s personal information
due to the explicit right assignment, but lose his access to her
Blog. In other words, implicit access right assignments are
based on group memberships, and explicit access rights are not
affected by group reassignment or reorganization, depending
on the visibility protocol used. That means that even though
explicit assignment is retained, conflicting rights may result in
a more restrictive access in case of pessimistic protocol and
more permissive access in an optimistic protocol.
C. User Defined Groups
To make group assignments easier, we allow users to create
their own group hierarchy consistent with our overall model.
Recall that the network is modeled as a DAG and so we are
allowed to have multiple roots. So the overall social network
consists of the system defined network hierarchy and all the
individual hierarchies defined by members. This feature helps
members manage their visibility assignments better because
they are now not required to speculate the implication of their
visibility assignment in a large and complex network. The
visibility protocol supplements this process by allowing the
member to assign an optimistic protocol to her own network if
she wants members in her network to retain the visibility rights
she assigned even when the group reassignment takes effect
at the system level. She chooses pessimistic protocol if she is
uncertain or has doubts. For example, let us say she allows
every one to see her phone number in her own network, but
when a member in that network is grouped as a sex offender,
she might not want that access to continue. Adoption of the
pessimistic protocol will help such a default effect.
III. DEFAULT PRIVACY POLICIES
While a considerable argument persists over what should
be private [3], [5], [2], [1] and how privacy should be ensured
[20], [4], [21], [22], [23], all agree that having a set of
privacy rules is a core requirement. Recent research, however,
suggest that complicated privacy policies usually deter users
from using privacy settings optimally. Behavior and user
interaction studies also reveal that typical users tend not to
change their default privacy settings mainly due to the burden
imposed in changing the defaults. On the other hand, in a
complex network of millions of users, setting privacy rules is
a formidable challenge for any casual user. These observations
make a compelling argument in favor of a model for smart and
effective default privacy rule generation [24], [25]. There has
been significant interest toward default privacy rule generation
in general for information repositories, but such endeavors for
social networks have been quite modest. We focus on two
proposals that advocate default privacy rules – one from the
point of view of user interactions, and the other from a more
technical standpoint.
A. Current State
Toch, Sadeh and Hong [25] propose a collaborative privacy
policy model in which they advocate a machine learning based
suggestion of default rules that are flexible, configurable and
highly likely to be accepted by the user. At the system level,
new users are presented with a limited set of personalized
default rules to choose from and configure. Default policies
are learned feedback of select groups of experienced users
of a location based social network system called Locaccino
[26]4. In this model, each rule has three parts: manually
selected groups of friends or peers who are allowed to see
their location, the temporal window during which the location
is shared, and finally locations that can be shared or disclosed.
The learning algorithm generated rules such as 1) share
location only when the user is on campus, 2) deny all requests
and 3) share location at all times.
Danezis [27], on the other hand, argues that context of
the information should be the prime driver for disclosure
decision because it is a more appropriate indicator of relevance
and perhaps “the right to know” as well. Context can be
dynamic and may change over time or space, and may render
information accessible now but was prohibited before. From
this conceptual point of view, the approach is substantially
powerful and interesting. The approach focuses on supporting
users wishing to restrict visibility to a subset of users of the
information generated as part of interaction with other users.
For such interactions, the model aims to infer the context
boundary within which the interaction should reside and
disallow users access to the interactions outside the boundary.
They propose algorithms for inferring user context, context
assignment to users, and assignment of default visibility to
the interaction.
B. Strengths and Limitations
There is a legitimate argument for default visibility rules and
these two, and other similar proposals, make that argument
convincingly from complementary viewpoints. An effective
policy suggestion has the potential of actually encouraging
users to use privacy settings beneficial for commerce and
the community. In contrast, ineffective suggestions may lead
to abuse and breach of privacy. Despite their strengths and
potentials, the limitations are relatively more pronounced. For
example, Locaccino’s discovered rules are quite rudimentary
and it is not clear if this model can actually be replicated
in other types of social networks where more interesting and
less obvious rules can be learned and suggested. Danezis’
context discovery is based on techniques requiring substan-
tial hints and inputs from users, and has the potential of
discouraging rather than helping. Regardless of the technical
limitations, default rules have fundamental non-user specific
characteristics, making them less appealing to discriminative
users. Therefore, if the suggested defaults do not have user
specific features offered without much feedback or input from
users, the chances of their effective use and acceptance remain
doubtful.
IV. DYNAMIC NETWORK STRUCTURES
The recent interest in exploiting social networks for com-
mercial purposes [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16] has trans-
4In a location based social network, geographical position is a prime
attribute, e.g., location of a coffee shop and the users who are around it.
formed them into a huge industry. One of the primary means
for many commercial activities depend upon identifying and
targeting users or groups. Network administrators often group
users into a hierarchy or classification scheme. In many
networks, users are often free to join in multiple such groups.
As the interest, characteristics, and profile of users change,
the network evolves. So the question arises, what happens to
privacy settings of users in the structurally morphed network?
While the answer to this question is still elusive, research in
network reorganization is very active [7], [17], [18], [10].
A. Current State
Schneier [7] introduces the idea that not all data should
have identical privacy rights. He classifies data into different
classes and argues that some data should have revocable
rights, and some may not. Derived information remains a
murky category, i.e., should FaceBook be allowed to sell our
browsing history for commercial purposes? This relates to
the notion of user classification and network organization,
and content ownership. The structure aware anonymization
method proposed in [18] is focused on protecting Schneier’s
derived behavioral data. The idea is to prevent identification
of vital private user information by making it hard to do so
when behavior networks are published by service providers for
commercial means. The question remains: How firmly does
anonymization protect privacy when the underlying network
evolves? Bhagat et al. [17] presents a method to quantify the
degree to which privacy may be preserved in an evolving
network by proper selection of anonymization properties. A
more subtle breach of privacy is by transitive disclosure [10] –
when users disclose information to a friend and another friend
gains access to it from him. This research demonstrates that
privacy guarantee improves when permissions are expressed in
terms of reachability constraints over members of the network
and user properties.
B. Strengths and Limitations
Most social networks essentially have two structures – one
that is visible to the public that composes users’ communities,
and their transitive relationships; the other is what the network
administrators see and create through various analytical means
that usually remain invisible. Most of the leading research
addresses issues related to visible, and not so much the invisi-
ble, network. Anonymization and transitive disclosure research
mainly concern visible networks and often do not take into
consideration issues Schneier raises and content classification
he proposes that have serious legal and social consequences.
The major issue with the dynamic behavior of the invisible
networks perhaps is their commercial implications. The jury is
still out on what happens to invisible network super structures
that site administrators create for commercial purposes or for
social control such as law enforcement. How such use violate
peoples’ free speech rights, privacy and so on is still an open
question and remain rarely discussed and addressed.
V. USER CONTROLLED PRIVACY
There are two complementary dimensions of the privacy
issue – users’ responsibility to safeguard their information
by specifying appropriate privacy rules, and the fiduciary
responsibility of system administrators to protect user infor-
mation (explicit or implicit). In this dual scheme, users need
tools to express their privacy settings [28] and understand the
implications of their rules in the evolving network [29], [30].
These rules must be robust and expressive enough to fend off
any privacy breach using the visible network. Once expressed,
the network administrator must ensure that the user rules are
respected at all times [31], [32] regardless of their interest
in a third party relationship (e.g., using user information for
commercial interests) based on perhaps Schneier’s content
classification [7]. The recent incident involving Representative
Anthony Wiener’s Twitter messages and exposing deleted
photos [27] by the network exemplifies this duality. Had
Twitter had “better” privacy settings, perhaps Rep. Wiener
could have avoided his career ending scandal (barring his
moral behavior). On the other hand, when a user deletes a
photo, the intent should be clear and allowing access to deleted
content undoubtedly is a serious privacy violation [27] and real
loss of privacy rights as opposed to an illusory loss [31].
A. Current State
Persona [28] is a system that empowers users with cryp-
tographic tools to control visibility of their contents. In this
system, fine grained, attribute based public-private key based
encryption is used to disclose information. Users are expected
to manage these keys with a well defined distributed responsi-
bility among peers and a network organization that groups
users into categories. Once set up, the implications of the
settings can be derived using research such as [29], [30] to
understand the full privacy consequence. Using visualization
tools, a user can see especially if an unwanted user or group
is likely to gain access to the sensitive content he has made
accessible to friends.
Yuan, Chen and Yu’s [32] network publication scheme is
along similar lines of research in network anonymization [18]
and denial of link discovery [10]. They, however, introduce
the notion of personalization in the anonymization process
and argue that user’s privacy requirements should dictate
how published networks are anonymized. They introduce the
notion of attacker’s background knowledge about users and the
network, and a three-level protection scheme. Given a constant
k and a set of assumed attacker’s background knowledge,
the protection scheme guards against identification of a user
(level 1), a relationship edge (level 2) and a relationship edge
involving two specific users (level 3) with a probability 1
k
. The
basic principle used is creating enough smokescreen to confuse
the attacker. Higher k ensures better safety, but increases the
cost to ensure it too.
B. Strengths and Limitations
While these two methods are interesting in their own rights,
they have substantial drawbacks. Technical limitations aside,
Persona’s passcode and key maintenance approach may be a
headache that users are least likely to accept. User studies
already show how reluctance in accepting a less than simple
and ready to go set of policy settings [25]. Given the growing
participation in the digital world, users have so many virtual
personalities that forgetting passwords is a frequent phenom-
ena severe enough for sites to include password and identity
retrieval help. Users are known to use the same password
and reset hints in almost all their digital logins indirectly
helping hackers crack them, creating a significant security
risk [25], [33], [34], [35], [36]. In addition to contributing to
the encryption key management debacle, Persona’s encryption
scheme also suffers from huge maintenance overhead. For ex-
ample, updating group membership discontinuation or network
reorganization forces a rekeying of all keys in the subnetwork.
The purpose of publishing a network is perhaps for a
specific and useful objective. Although the publication scheme
presented in [32] deters attackers from finding information
in the published networks, it is not clear how effective the
publication scheme is to the stated objectives of the networks.
It is also not clear how this scheme adjusts to the dynamic
behavior of the network as it evolves.
VI. ACCESS CONTROL AS A PRIVACY THEORY
As we have alluded to earlier, sensitive social network
information basically are of two types – user information
such as profiles and friends network, and derived information
from the behavior and user profiles in the community they
participate. Access control theory as a privacy instrument is
mainly concerned with the protection of basic information.
In recent years, several models have been proposed, and
some have gained serious attention. Among them are the
rule based privilege computation model [23], privacy aware
keyword search [37], and access control based on ontology
[38], learning [39], evolution [40] and roles [41].
A. Current State
The basic model for access control in social network
involves an information request or a query by a user. The
response is computed by the network considering what data
a user has access to where the space of accessible data is
decided by user privacy settings. Since the network is primarily
responsible for computing the response and ensuring privacy,
machineries need to be in place to compute access right of
the users, identify the accessible data space, and process the
query efficiently.
The rule based privacy language of Carminati et al. [23]
focuses on determining user access rights based on access
control policies such as, if Bob is a friend of Nina and Nina
has a photo, Bob has read access to the photo. Or a more
restrictive rule is if Bob is a friend of Nina, Nina has a
photo and she granted access to Bob, Bob has read access
to the photo. The rule language is proposed in the context
of semantic web based systems in which SWRL is used to
encode security rules. Provisions are created to declare access
control authorizations and prohibitions stating what privileges
are allowed or disallowed. Then a reasoner is used to decide if
access to a data item can be granted to a subject with a given
privilege level.
Many search engines including Google and Bing support
keyword search over Twitter posts, and Facebook allows
searching of friends’ posts. Often such posts and commu-
nications are private or restricted to friends, and friends of
friends. The inverted indexing scheme proposed in [37] aims to
efficiently compute search queries over such data considering
privacy settings of users which tend to become inefficient
due to a large number of redundant documents accessible
by several users. They have shown that using their indices
for posts and users, scalability can be improved and privacy
preserved.
B. Strengths and Limitations
One of the major advantages of these models is that they
empower the user and enhance the security apparatus that pro-
tects basic information. If the protection of basic information is
guaranteed, privacy models for derived information will also
benefit. The implication is that this will offer clarity about
public view of user contents and we will then be left with
deciding what derived information are legally public or usable
without user consent. The space of this information is expected
to be smaller and less complex than it is now.
The limitations, however, in general are pronounced. For
example, though unique in their approach, the search technique
introduced in [37] does not consider the actual network which
is always evolving. It is not known how the ranking function
the authors proposed would behave in real networks. The rule
based model [23] though exciting, relies heavily on system
level privacy policies that may be too general for users who
tend to avoid using generic privacy settings or use it improp-
erly [25], [33], [34], [35], [36]. This language also has limited
primitives to support user privacy settings, preferences, and
community building and participation. The rule specification
language in ontology assisted privacy model proposed in [38]
is complex enough to serve as a bottleneck. While the classifier
based learning approach in [39] offers control to users, the
management and the complexity associated with the selection
of the training data, parameter setting and evolution of the
network may act as serious deterrents. Despite their technical
limitations, research in this direction seems to be useful and
appealing.
VII. QUERY LANGUAGE FOR PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT
Social networks being a huge database, naturally oppor-
tunities exist for designing languages to query and analyze
their contents [42], [23], [43], [44], [45]. Traditionally in
databases, authorization and access control has been left
as an orthogonal issue from query languages amounting to
view generation as an all or nothing proposition, although
fine grained authorization has been investigated, e.g., in the
context of multi-level security [46]. Social networks being
graph structured data, query languages for graphs also become
relevant [47]. The distinction in the case of social network data
is that each user data privacy policy is distinct from the rest
of the users, and thus addressing access control in bulk as in
relational model seems unworkable, or at least inefficient. A
fine grained method instead appears more appropriate. Given
the complexity of the data type, representation and granularity,
making privacy provisions at the query language level may
yield a better platform.
A. Current State
SNQL [44] is a pattern query language for social network
databases that has provisions for creating new network struc-
tures and analysis. It follows on the footsteps of a long chain
of research in pattern query languages such as BiQL [45],
SocialScope [48] and SoQL [43]. Though not specifically
designed for social networks, GraphQL is a declarative pattern
language designed for network data querying with comple-
mentary features for structures. The construct where from
structure has a flavor similar to SQL’s select from where.
Expressive but complicated triple patterns and conditions may
be expressed respectively in the construct and where clauses.
The rule language of Carminati et al. [42], [23] is another
prominent example of this category of systems that uses query
language to support privacy (see previous section for more
discussion on this language).
B. Strengths and Limitations
These two complementary class of languages has obvious
strengths, but they also suffer from critical shortcomings. In
particular, the rule language is not designed to support user
specification of privacy rules. Instead a set of rules is treated
as privacy axioms that apply to all. Similar to SNQL, it is
also unaware of the evolving nature of the network. More
importantly, it does not particularly consider user groups,
hierarchies and exceptions of privacy rules that may apply.
But the idea that rules can be applied to decide privileges is
an interesting concept not found in many approaches. SNQL
on the other hand, is focused on structure manipulation and
treats privacy as a separate issue.
VIII. OUTLINE OF A PRIVACY QUERY LANGUAGE
FOR SOCIAL NETWORKS
In view of the issues raised in sections III through VII, and
the reference conceptual model for social networks introduced
in section II, we now discuss a possible query language
that can address most of them directly and help address the
remaining ones indirectly. We identify features and concepts
that we can assemble in a language we believe will be
sufficient to address them. Our position is that once such a
language is available, it can be extended with network and
pattern analysis capabilities to incorporate features available
in SNQL [44], SocialScope [48] and SoQL [43].
We believe many of the disclosure related problems in
social networks could be remedied by adopting a content
classification scheme similar to Schneier [7] that will be able
to withstand any legal scrutiny, and then designing a query
language that respects the disclosure rules implied by this
classification. Since legality is a time varying concept, the
language will need to be sensitive to this as well. Once
a query language is available to access legally disclosable
information, secondary information contents can be derived
from this accessible set. Only issue we then will have to
deal with is how we share and use information that are not
legally public, which we believe is arguably a smaller set.
In our vision, a query language that allows some form of
reasoning, perhaps a rule-based framework, with the capability
of inheritance with overriding in class hierarchies stand the
best chance of addressing most of the issues we raised in
sections III through VII in a comprehensive manner in the
context of the reference model introduced in section II.
For example, many object-oriented query languages support
objects, class hierarchies, inheritance, overriding, encapsula-
tion and signatures. The class hierarchy feature may be used
to organize members and groups in the manner described in
sections II-A and II-B as part of our reference model. Members
in a group can be made to adhere to specific structures such
as having specific profiles and contents as in many object-
oriented databases (mandatory and optional properties). An
auxiliary system may use these properties, along with other
properties, to classify and reclassify members as needed. Users
may also create member groups for their own purposes as
discussed in section II-C to gain greater control in assigning
access rights.
Visibility of properties and contents (discussed in sections
II-B1 and II-B2) owned by members may be captured as
signatures in a way similar to the notion of encapsulation
in object-oriented databases to control access to protected
contents. Then, as opposed to inheritance of default class
values and methods, the visibility rules captured as signatures
may be allowed to be inherited in the class hierarchy with over-
riding to model fine-grain visibility as definition specificity. By
adopting a “choice mechanism” among a set of visibility rules,
we could implement the notion of optimistic and cautious
visibility protocols introduced in section II-B3. Such a choice
mechanism will help deal with conflicts in multiple inheritance
hierarchies and class structure reorganization in fairly simple
ways.
Since we allow class reorganization, conflicting access
rights are likely to result due to membership in multiple groups
even though overriding of access rights in the inheritance
hierarchy will ensure singular visibility in a specific inheri-
tance path. Parameterization of traditional encapsulation may
be used to grant access to specific groups or members, as
opposed to global access to everyone often found in object-
oriented systems. Further parameterization to include cautious
and optimistic protocols may be used to allow a more finer
grained access and privacy. For example, Nina may allow all
PistonFans to see her age in cautious mode, but her NinaPhoto
picture in optimistic mode. So, in the event of a conflict,
PistonFans may not see her age, but they will always see
her picture if she granted read permission to both. Not that, to
allow uninterrupted access (or no access) to anyone or a group,
all a member has to do is specify access rule for that group
or member specifically and no reorganization will impact that
declared visibility as this declaration will override all other
declaration. Recall that conflicts arise only due to no specific
rules and a group or member inherits conflicting visibilities.
The language we outlined above has already addressed the
issue of dynamic structures (discussed in IV), user controlled
privacy (discussed in section V), and query language (dis-
cussed in section VII). The issue of default privacy policy
discussed in section III is partially addressed in the proposed
language, i.e., by default all contents and properties are invis-
ible. But tools can be developed to assist users to determine
what default privacy settings are useful and safe for them on
a case by case basis, and many of the systems discussed may
be adapted to serve this need. Since we advocate a rule based
language, deductive privacy settings discussed in section VI
can now be easily implemented using visibility rules at the
desired granularity. We foresee no need for any specific tool
or separate mechanism to address this issue.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this paper was to briefly survey contemporary
research on privacy in social networks in four complementary
axes. We have proposed a conceptual model social network
style for digital communities with privacy. In this model, users
are given the tools and the prime responsibility of defining
their own privacy rules with a simple semantics. We believe
that the proposed model fares well with these criteria. As
presented in sections III through VII, most models favor one
or the other feature and are not comprehensive enough. We
believe it is because the model used in each research was
not designed anew from the ground up, and thus retained
the original shortcomings. The discussion in each of these
sections summarize why we believe these systems need to
accommodate the features proposed in our model.
The distinctive features of our model include an explicit
mechanism for users to define a DAG like structure for
grouping communities, and allowing the system to do the same
for its own purposes. We have shown that hierarchy of users
and objects make it possible to model privacy and exceptions
using non-monotonic inheritance of visibility privileges. The
interesting property is that network reorganization does not
require any corrective measure to reestablish user view of
privacy. Since privacy is modeled as visibility rules at the user
level on the basic view of the network, it is expected that any
derived view will not violate the privacy view of users. We,
however, used only one class of content and a binary visibility
setting, although Schneier’s [7] view of content classification
can also be accommodated in this model.
In [19], we have already proposed a declarative privacy
query language based on the reference model introduced in
this paper. In [19], we have demonstrated that the features
of the model introduced in this paper can actually be cast
into a sound and complete first-order object-oriented language.
We are currently developing a visualization toolkit to assist
users grasp the implications of their privacy specifications,
and offer access to content through queries. While we did not
include a discussion on an explicit privacy implication toolkit
in this paper, this can be added orthogonally along the lines
of Fang and LeFevre [29] and Anwar et al. [30] using which,
users will be able to comprehend the implications of their
privacy settings. It is also possible to develop default setting
suggestions tool kits along the lines of [26], [27].
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